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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTIONS 
South Africa‟s liberal democratic constitution allows for political competition for 
office, enhanced by the media‟s involvement or role, as both stakeholder and 
facilitator for debate between the public and political parties. The role of the media 
becomes a sensitive one as it entails perspectives on the political process and, as 
a consequence, certain perceptions of the political class, structures and electoral 
process will emerge. In previous elections the media has been cited for abdicating 
its objective stance in the narrative on political competition in view of candidate 
lists, party coalitions and allocation of value through cadre deployment, a term 
used for political appointments within party structures to positions of leadership in 
public office. Accordingly, it provokes intense debates in which the rationality of 
liberal-objective-observer to democratic process is criticized by thinking which 
argues that such rationality remains trapped by a devotion to „liberalist rituals‟, 
rituals detached from embedded meanings specific to South Africa‟s socio-political 
dynamics. 
 
This research seeks to critically examine mainstream media discourse on political 
competition in South Africa, through elections, and its relationship to allocation of 
value through the practice of cadre deployment. This will entail an interrogation of 
the nature of mainstream print media discourse with regard to reports on political 
appointments through political party structures, known as cadre deployment, as 
mandated by party strategies.  Through this examination the study will seek to 
further examine how media representation of elections and party lists has the 
potential to, through framing, shape voter perception in view of cadre deployment. 
This potential to shape voter perception is seen in Entman‟s argument that all 
influence over „what people think‟ derives from telling them „what to think about‟ 
and if the latter is true, the media must also exert significant influence over what 
they think (2007: 165). 
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The study will employ macro-discourse analysis through textual analysis, within 
framing theory, in examining media representation of the electoral process and 
cadre deployment as contained in mainstream newspaper reports. According to 
Druckman and Chong “…framing organises everyday reality by providing meaning 
to an unfolding strip of events…promoting particular definitions and interpretations 
of political issues…” (2007:109). The end result is not only thinking about issues 
but, according to Entman (1993) and Druckman and Chong (2007), frames affect 
attitudes and behaviors of their intended audiences. Entman argues further that 
governments seeking support for their programmes are forced “…to compete with 
each other and with journalists over news frames…in the exertion of political 
power…” which is manifest in news texts (1993:55).  
 
1.2 Key Concepts 
Transformation: means a radical change in form, nature, or appearance of a thing 
or person. In the South African context the term refers to change in form, nature 
and appearance of political, social and economic structuring of society from 
„apartheid‟ to an inclusive, democratic society. 
Cadre deployment: the term refers to political appointments within party 
structures to positions of leadership in public office. Such appointments are 
intended at meeting a party‟s policy objectives including transformation. In South 
Africa the term is commonly associated with the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the discourse of political patronage. 
Allocation of value: this term refers to the calculated distribution of prized 
resources. In the study of politics it is used more specifically in accounting for the 
distribution of power. One interpretation of allocation of value on South Africa‟s 
context would point at political competition being a means to an end and cadre 
deployment part of an end to the means. 
Framing: the term refers to the act of selectively organising information for 
presentation to an audience, in order to promote certain interpretations and 
meanings; the frame itself is not the subject of attention but serves to „enhance‟ 
the „picture‟. With regards to media practise, it can be viewed as the act of 
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focusing attention on certain events and then placing them within a field of 
meaning (this process can be unconscious or hidden to the receiver/reader) 
 
Keywords: cadre deployment; governance; public sphere; framing; discourse; 
discourse analysis; transformation;  
   
1.3 Background & Context of Research 
South Africa is considered a young democracy having transitioned into a 
constitutional democracy in 1994. The years of segregation, prior 1994, have 
produced a society that is still battling social and economic inequalities despite 
attempts at broad inclusion of all groups, especially those previously marginalized 
based for example on race and gender.  Post 1994 South African politics have 
been concerned with driving transformation on the above-mentioned socio-
economic categories,  with the media playing a central role as an agent not only at 
pointing to guidelines of redress, but also through constitutionally mandated 
processes of transformation, championing the ideal of equality through electoral 
processes and the allocation of symbolic power through the ballot.  
 
1.3.1 Media as agent of transformation  
The idea of the media as an agent, and consequently South African politics being 
largely mediated is further argued by Johnston when he says “…where there is a 
combination of some form of liberal democracy with consumer-orientated media, 
especially where English is the language of the political class and … society and 
the economy are open to globalising influences, then an increasingly mediated 
political public sphere will develop” (2005:13). Since this has been the case with 
South Africa, citizens can in turn be justified to expect the media to fulfill its roles of 
agent of transformation. Post 1994 its roles include that of a watchdog, providing a 
platform for public discourse on the meaning of democracy, and meaningfully 
educating the electorate on their participation in the democratic process. These 
roles point to what Habermas (1974) termed the „public sphere‟, where society in 
the form of public opinion meets the state in the form of public information. 
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Framing of South African politics has largely employed liberal democratic 
discourse which seems at odds with the country‟s transformation agenda and 
where its agent of transformation role has not come through in mainstream 
reports. The „watchdog‟ role has taken centre stage, wherein the ruling party is 
accused of corruption at first instance where cadre deployment is concerned, 
without critical analysis of what the process means to South Africa‟s democracy.   
 
1.3.2 Contesting „watchdoggism‟ in cadre deployment 
Willems‟ critique of the watchdog role of the media within liberal democracy 
questions the notion of „good governance‟ and „democracy‟ as a „one size fits all‟ 
proposition globally (2012: 91-92). This criticism is extended to the South African 
media in the view that the role has turned to a ritual expressed in sensationalist 
reporting of the South African political processes, producing reactive and biased 
news reports with little or no insight into socio-economic realities on the ground, 
consequently fuelling racist and cultural tensions as seen in reader comments on 
news websites. Jessie Duarte, deputy secretary of the ANC, has decried this state 
of affairs within the South African print industry as a sign of being “trapped in the 
mould of selling the newspaper and not telling the story” (The Media, 2013: 8), 
while Mantashe has commented on the media being „the main opposition‟ in South 
Africa (IOL, 2011). 
 
Duarte and Mantashe‟s comments seem to be validated also by the media‟s 
tendency to provide reporting that seems to criminalize cadre deployment from the 
first instance, yet it stands as a legitimate general practice within SA party politics 
in line with policy within the proportional representation party list system during 
elections. These media representations tend to magnify or focus on failed or failing 
departments on the basis of incompetent and unqualified cadres deployed to 
management positions. These reports are usually supported or substantiated with 
comments from opposition parties such as Christian Democratic Party (CDP) and 
Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) (City Press & Daily Maverick 
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2012) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (All Africa, 2012), all calling for the 
ruling party to do away with the strategy.   
 
Such criticisms however provoke critical response on two accounts. Firstly, there 
are several success stories which the media undervalues. Secondly, one sees 
silenced contradictions when such success stories are attributed solely to 
individuals, yet reports on poor performance malign the whole cadre deployment 
process. Examples of successful deployments which generally remain understated 
include Home Affairs Department under Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Health Ministry 
under Aaron Motsoaledi, and South African Revenue Services (SARS) under 
Pravin Gordhan. However success in the Office of the Public Protector under Thuli 
Madonsela has increasingly been attributed to her as an individual. Cases in which 
cadre deployment did not work and tended to attract negative media reporting 
include appointments to the Security Cluster in President Jacob Zuma‟s first 
administration with Nathi Mthethwa heading Police Services together with Police 
Commisioner Riah Phiyega, Jeff Radebe heading Justice, Siyabonga Cwele 
heading State Security, including state organs falling under these ministries such 
as the National Prosecuting Authority first under Mokotedi Mpshe, then Menzi 
Simelane, the Hawks, and the Independent Police Investigative Division (IPID). 
 
Ultimately, at the center of public debate sits the rationale for adopting cadre 
deployment as a party strategy for transformation, and such strategy can either be 
misrepresented or obscured and, depending on how cadre deployment is framed, 
perceptions of failure or success can be created. The general perception created 
in the media is that all personnel movements (appointments, resignations and 
sacking) made within the Security cluster are for the purposes of protecting 
President Jacob Zuma from ultimately facing corruption charges brought against 
him, which were later dropped by former acting NPA head, Mokotedi Mpshe.  
 
Such reporting may intensify perceptions of corruption and nepotism, and that 
public office is a ticket for one to „get a chance to eat at the table‟, thus redefine 
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political competition and original intent of cadre deployment in the mind of the 
voter. On the other hand it would be in the government‟s interest to defend its 
decisions and processes in order to retain its position of influence over the voter‟s 
mind, hence Mantashe and Duarte‟s comments on media acting the opposition in 
how they report South Africa‟s political processes. 
 
1.4 Rationale of the Research 
Firstly, this study seeks to contribute to scholarship of the media‟s role in post 
1994 transformational processes within South African politics, beyond the study of 
media rituals around the watchdog function and freedom of expression with 
regards to liberal democracy. With regard to everyday practice, concerns raised by 
the ruling elite, of a media that has become oppositional, warrant an examination 
of media discourse on the mandated democratic processes which in the case of 
South Africa include social transformation.  
  
Secondly, it is hoped the study will encourage further research into media‟s role in 
constructing reality through framing. Framing through linguistic representation also 
carries a danger of reporting through massive speculation, leading to huge 
margins of error from fact with consequence of creating a discourse of wrong 
advice to the electorate. This is because unless a reporter has internal information, 
or the internal working of government or political party machinery, they will either 
repeat or report from observations made from a distance, and at times in error.  
 
The study does not seek to excuse failures where party lists have brought in 
persons who have not delivered on their constitutional mandates, rather it is an 
examination at the tendency and ritual to summarily dismiss the imperative of 
transformation through ritualistic libertarian reporting. 
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1.5 Research Question 
Does South African media framing of the relationship between elections and cadre 
deployment, shape political engagements among the electorate and other political 
stakeholders in post 1994 South Africa‟s quest for transformation? 
 
1.6 Sub-Questions 
 What have been the trends in news narrative with regards to political 
transformation processes before and during elections?  
 How does the media representation of election lists and cadre deployment 
compare to the intent and practice of the party list process?  
 How do media reports treat individual deployments differently? 
 What factors contribute to these trends in representations and why?  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD 
2.1  LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the important elements of political competition is elections, which is but one 
aspect of democracy (Lindberg, 2003:122). Elections are seen to represent the 
voice or opinion of the citizens, and are a facilitator of political change or transfer 
of power, or maintenance of the status quo. Seen from this perspective, and from 
Reynolds‟ (2009:76) view that elections are a requirement of democracy as 
governments need consent from the governed to rule, it can be said that elections 
give ascendence to authoritative power and allocative legitimation of that authority.   
 
A key, and often over emphasised, aspect of this legitimation is patronage. 
Kopecky describes patronage as “the ability of political parties to appoint members 
…to positions in the public and semi-public sector…” (2011:717) and distinguishes 
this type of patronage from clientelism and corruption. He further argues that cadre 
deployment is usually sanctioned by the dominant party in order to control policy 
formulation and implementation, and therefore is not considered illegal or corrupt. 
In the South African context the ANC as the dominant party in government, 
formally adopted cadre deployment in 1997 as part of its strategy for 
transformation, reinforcing its legitimacy as the party in authority, during the 
transition from apartheid into democracy (ANC, 1997). Media discourse has 
however understated this aspect of cadre deployment, and has tended to create 
doubt that could potentially lead to ambivalence to the legitimacy and the process 
of cadre deployment. This tendency necessitates deeper examination of media 
discourse with regards to legitimation of cadre deployment in relation to political 
competition.  
 
On the one hand, cadre deployment can become a problem if appointments to 
public office are carried out to reward loyalty or buy/ensure personal favours as 
these are the first signs of the second type of patronage, clientelism. In his article 
Lindberg (2003) dwells much on the clientelistic type of patronage, which is 
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fraudulent, self-serving and corrupt, and whose essence is captured in the book 
“It‟s our turn to eat” by Michela Wrong (2009). Although the focus of this study 
shall be on cadre deployment to public office, patronage shall be taken to include 
clientelism in its definition, unless specified as either cadre deployment or 
clientelism. How this patronage is distributed is largely influenced by the type of 
electoral processes and systems in place in a particular democracy.    
 
In South Africa political competition, based on the electoral system, is driven by 
party lists as prescribed by proportional representation rules pre-election. This 
serves to intensify intraparty and interparty competition as it presupposes patron 
and client. This already suggests at allocation of value for smaller parties who are 
seeking office, and often results in convenient interparty alignments. Resnick 
(2011:735-736) argues that most pre-election coalitions are based on “office-
seeking, rather than policy-seeking, motives” based on the fact that coalitions tend 
to see parties with different ideological orientations coalesce to win an election or 
to oust the incumbent ruling party. In their articles, Carrol and Cox (2007) and 
Back et al (2010) do not explicitly say why pre-electoral and governing coalitions 
are entered into but, by focusing on how ministerial portfolios are distributed 
amongst coalition members, the implication is that the agenda is to attain public 
office.  
 
In their research on candidate selection methods within political parties and their 
political consequence, Hazan and Rahat argue that candidate selection 
“…influences the balance of power within the party…impacts on the behavior of 
legislators…and is central to politics in any representative democracy…” (2010: 3). 
They further argue that selected candidates “…will help define [party] 
characteristics – demographically, geographically, and ideologically – more than its 
organization or its manifesto…” (2010:5). Viewed from this perspective, party lists 
are not the subject of interest only to journalists but to voters, foreign countries as 
well as foreign investors. In South Africa‟s instance, this part of the political 
process is made more interesting by the ANC-SACP-COSATU coalition which 
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represents different interests/ideologies, and from which the ANC selects its 
candidates.  
 
In Africa, coalitions based on ethnic, racial and regional links/identities support 
prominent debates which argue that ethnicity becomes another tool for ascent to 
power, and that it becomes prominent during election periods (Eifert et al: 
2010:494). Power in Africa confers a strong perception of close access to state 
resources and, because of strong ties between kinsmen, an expectation between 
patron and client is created. Nyamnjoh and Rowlands link ethnic identity and the 
fact that Africans have always viewed it as “…a responsibility of educated elites to 
help others from the same family and to pass the benefits of their success back to 
their village of origin” (1998:321) thus reinforcing the argument that ethnicity 
becomes a tool in the struggle for power. 
  
According to Eifert et al “…allocation of resources in Africa tends to follow ethnic 
lines and…elections are the time for deciding who will allocate those resources” 
(2010:495). Although South Africa has laws that prohibit campaigning on ethnic 
and race cards, it is interesting to note ANC provincial membership patterns 
between 1999 and 2010 (ANC online). This is the period when the party was under 
the leadership of Thabo Mbeki (who is from the Eastern Cape) and Jacob Zuma 
(who is from KwaZulu-Natal). Nyamnjoh calls for “a look beyond political parties 
and liberal democracy as the exclusive way of organising modern politics and 
government in Africa” (2005:34) if ethnicity and regional links continue to be the 
deciding factor in loyalties and voting behavior. 
 
The interest of this study is finding out how South African media speaks about 
these dynamics of political competition. According to Frere (2011) some of the 
main functions of the media during elections include informing citizens of the 
relevant electoral codes and processes, serving as a platform for society‟s diverse 
views and opinions to be heard and provide a platform for competing political 
parties to present their programmes. This kind of representation, according to 
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Willems turns elections into another media ritual, assuming a universal meaning of 
elections, and ignores what she terms “the embedded meaning” that elections 
carry in the African context (2012:104).  The Western idea of liberal democracy, 
which is what Frere‟s argument is based on, glosses over the historical realities 
that complicate electoral politics in Africa over legitimate allocation of value and 
ignores the ideological role of media in constructing a certain reality for voters. 
 
Sesanti (2008) re-inforces Willems argument of „embedded meanings‟ in the 
African context by noting that “in order for black journalists to promote democracy 
effectively in South Africa they have to show an acknowledgement and 
understanding of African culture [with regard to moral philosophy and leadership 
perspectives]…similarly in assessing progress or lack of…[they] need to 
demonstrate…an understanding of the history of Africans along with the values 
that informed their march to progress…” (Hadland, Louw, Sesanti & Wasserman; 
2008: 366-370)  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 Frames/Framing 
According to Entman (1993) frames manifest themselves in discourse through 
language, which is the tool used to represent a „perceived reality‟ or [construct 
meaning]. Entman describes framing theory as a framework for “…selecting some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition …interpretation 
…evaluation and…treatment recommendation” (1993:52) and thereby offers a way 
to describe the power of a communicating text, which means “frames introduce or 
raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that 
encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way…and it is 
through framing that political actors shape the texts that influence or prime the 
agendas and considerations that people think about…” (2007: 165). According to 
Entman “framing works to shape and alter audience members‟ interpretations and 
preferences through priming…[and] employing agenda setting, framing and 
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priming under the conceptual umbrella of bias would advance understanding of the 
media‟s role in distributing power…” (2007:164).  
 
Entman‟s framing theory therefore becomes the basis of discourse analysis as “all 
[discourse analysis approaches] share the starting point that our ways of talking do 
not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but…play an active 
role in creating and changing them” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:1). „Our ways of 
talking‟ in this instance refers to language employed in expressing ideas or a 
perceived reality, which means discourse is manifest through language use.  
Stainton Rogers (2011:132) offers two discourse analysis strategies: micro-
discourse analysis and macro-discourse analysis, both based on various versions 
of discourse analysis developed over the years by critical social psychologists.  
 
Macro-discourse analysis is also termed Foucauldian discourse analysis based on 
Foucault‟s work on production of knowledge and power (Stainton Rogers, 2011). 
Foucault‟s argument is that power should not only be understood in the negative 
as oppressive, but that it is also productive and that discourse constitutes power 
and knowledge (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002:13). From his point of view “discourses 
facilitate and limit, enable and constrain what can be said, by whom, where and 
when…” (Stainton Rogers, 2011: 136). Foucault‟s theory has consequences for 
concepts such as „truth‟, „fairness‟ and „objectivity‟ when analysing media 
discourse, which Fairclough agrees with (2003). The study will adopt a macro-
discourse analysis of libertarian framing that can be seen in news reports on cadre 
deployment, which [macro-discourse analysis] does not concern itself with detailed 
analysis of texts but rather practises within libertarian discourse that seem to have 
unwritten rules, reflected in text, that contribute to constructing a certain reality 
around cadre deployment. 
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2.3  Method 
The study adopted macro-discourse analysis with respect to framing theory in 
seeking to do a critical examination of frames in media reports carried in The 
Sunday Times, The Mail & Guardian, City Press Online and The New Age Online. 
This critical examination is in relation to language use in constructing social reality 
and framing power with regards to cadre deployment as conceived in party lists for 
presidential appointments through the process of elections in 2014. Frames 
analysed include i) the topic of a news item and language used in presenting 
information in that particular news item ii) cognitive attributes, which is concerned 
with details of what is included in the frame iv) affective attributes, which refers to 
tone of the text (Ghanem, 1997:10).   
 
2.3.1 Sampling and coding 
For sufficient sampling, content analysis was used in selecting articles from twenty 
six issues (01 January – 30 June 2014) of two weekly newspapers in South Africa: 
Mail & Guardian and The Sunday Times, during election year. A breakdown of the 
number of times political transformation issues appear in the selected sample of 
newspaper articles, and explanation on codes used is provided below:    
 
 Total  el pl & ca depl sd psa gi pa pc ipc itpc op 
M&G 149 73 23 23 37 28 31 51 6 37 20 16 
ST 144 77 19 10 15 12 16 26 1 9 21 24 
 
el – elections 
pl & ca – party lists and candidates  
depl – deployment (ministers and deputy ministers) 
sd – service delivery 
psa – public service appointments (top management in government and 
parastatals) 
gi – governance issues 
pa – patronage in all forms (corruption, nepotism, fraud, to include ministerial 
benefits & benefits that accrue as a result of power/position) 
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pc – party coalitions 
ipc – intraparty competition 
itpc – interparty competition 
op – news on opposition parties 
 
Sampling of news reports from the digital/online papers was done randomly, 
depending on results returned upon searching for keywords such as “South 
African elections 2014; cadre deployment; party lists 2014; candidate lists 2014”. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTEXTUALISING POLITICAL COMPETITION IN S.A. POST 1994 
3.1 South Africa’s Transformation Agenda 
South Africa has had to embark on a process of redressing political, social and 
economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid past, and therefore 
transformation comprises as its key aspects power, race, class / economics. The 
negotiated transition into democracy in South Africa came as a result of decades 
of resistance to colonialism and apartheid, a system Mhone and Edigheji describe 
as “…one of the most oppressive and exploitative…in modern history in which 
racial, class and gender oppression were consciously intertwined to underpin a 
system of domination and subjugation of the [Black majority] while it systematically 
empowered the White minority economically, socially and politically” (2003:5). In 
the process of fighting the racist, segrationist laws enacted by the apartheid 
government, the marginalized majority were largely led by liberation movements 
such as the ANC, IFP, PAC, UDF.  
 
CODESA talks played a vital role in ushering in a democratic dispensation in 
South Africa, wherein a negotiated settlement was reached for political transition. 
CODESA, in all its usefulness comprised heavy compromises for the majority that 
was seeking inclusion which included what was termed “sunset clauses”1 which in 
effect ensured nothing was done to transform/rearrange economic power, 
ownership in major corporations and was silent on reversing inequalities / 
injustices in land ownership (ANC, 1997). According to the liberation movement 
CODESA was a tool to facilitate for transfer of political power, which in turn would 
establish a platform for further transformation of socio-economic inequalities. 
 
Subsequently the ANC has won all national elections since 1994 and thus has 
been the governing party since. In its 1997 strategy and tactics document, adopted 
at its 50th National Conference in that same year, the party outlines the reasons at 
transforming all levels of power to serve the interests of all South Africans, as well 
as action plans to achieving a transformed society  (ANC, 1997). Even then the 
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party acknowledged that political victory did not automatically mean a transformed 
society, as resistance would continue from those opposed to transformation, but 
that a long term strategy had to be mapped out in order to attain a economically 
equitable, “non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society”.  
 
South Africa‟s new constitution adopted in 1996 became the framework within 
which the governing party could “start implementing programmes of 
transformation” (ANC, 1992) in areas such as the public service, housing, 
education, health, infrastructure, land re-distribution as well as the economy which 
would benefit all South Africans. According to Picard “the new South Africa 
inherited a racially skewed public service in which 95.5% of the top 3,239 civil 
servants were white, and only 0.6% black African...black Africans made up the 
vast majority of public servants in the lower ranks, with a few middle and senior 
level public servants in the homeland Governments” (Picard, 2005: 40, 45) & 
(Kanyane, Houston & Sausi, 2013: 133). The ANC also acknowledged in its 
strategies and tactics document that “the majority of public servants…the captains 
of industry and editorial rooms in most media shared perspectives of the former 
government… all moulded to attain the opposite of what [the ANC intends] to 
achieve…all of them strategically placed to influence the agenda of transformation 
in favour of the privileged classes…” (ANC, 1997). 
 
Parallel to social transformation, the new ANC government pursued economic 
transformation through various policy frameworks such as the RDP and BEE, 
whose main drives were seen as “…redistribution of income and opportunities in 
favour of the poor…[and] in order to make it more inclusive of the previously 
excluded majority…” (Mhone, 2003: 23, 38). Fundamentally the new ANC 
government considered the role of the state as critical therefore in socio-economic 
transformation, and public service as one of the tools to effect this transformation 
(ANC, 1997). In order to effectively use public service as a tool there was a need 
to transform the sector itself into a single, demographically representative and 
efficient public service.  
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Sidloyi (1996:140) points out that “the new government faced reform of a bloated 
public service which was sapping national resources, and not delivering even the 
existing, racially biased services with anything approaching efficiency…”. In 1997 
the ANC formally adopted cadre deployment as a party strategy to effect 
transformation within the public service so that it could serve South African society 
as a whole and to accelerate service delivery to the previously marginalized. 
Principles to guide this process are contained in the constitution and relevant 
statutes such as affirmative action within the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and 
political competition within the Electoral Act of 1998.  
 
Mafunisa (2003:99) discusses the relationship between politics and public service 
and concludes that for the South African context a politicised public service model 
is not only suitable but recommended especially taking into consideration the 
transformation agenda of the country. He further presents the challenge with this 
model as it may be “…subject to abuse by corrupt politicians and senior public 
servants…[since] emphasis in the politicised model is more on political patronage 
than on the merit principle”.  
 
3.2 South Africa’s Electoral System 
In the case of South Africa ascendancy to, and distribution of, power and its 
implied allocation of value as highlighted in the previous chapter, is largely 
influenced by the type of electoral processes and systems in place in the country 
based on the constitution. Prior 1994 South Africa made use of constituency-
based elections, while post 1994 national and provincial elections have used 
proportional representation and party lists, and local government elections use a 
mixture of the two systems (Parliament SA Online). The proportional 
representation system was negotiated as a settlement at the multi-party 
negotiations finalized in 1993, and was meant to be used as a transitional electoral 
system into democracy together with the interim constitution, managed by an 
interim Transitional Executive Council (Election Resources Online).  
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The main reason cited for the interim electoral measures was the absence of a 
common voters roll, but proportional representation was confirmed as a 
constitutional requirement when the country‟s final constitution was adopted in 
1996 and therefore the system has remained unchanged. Du Plessis notes that 
“the worldwide trend is towards such systems, since they are eminently fair and 
reflect the will of the voters most accurately” (2002:3). With proportional 
representation voters vote for political parties and each political party chooses 
members who will serve as its representatives in parliament based on party lists. 
The party lists are submitted to the IEC before an election in a numbered order of 
preference, and parties are allocated parliamentary seats in proportion to the votes 
they get in elections (Parliament SA online). This kind of electoral process has 
served as a first step to South Africa‟s transformation from white minority rule to 
representative politics.  
 
Again, in arguing for this system, Du Plessis says that “[it] has no serious flaws, 
other than a disadvantage perceived by some in respect of accountability, and has 
passed the test of practical implementation…[also], compilation of candidate lists 
in their present form gives a party the opportunity to balance its representation in 
terms of gender, interest groups and skills” (2002:4). The „perceived disadvantage 
in respect of accountability‟ to which Du Plessis refers is based on the notion that 
the members of parliament chosen by the party that wins elections and forms a 
new government, become accountable to the political party and not directly to 
voters. In South Africa, as outlined in the previous chapter, this also serves to 
intensify intraparty and interparty competition as it presupposes allocation of value, 
access to state power and resources through deployment.  
 
3.2.1 Proportional representation and party lists 
Party lists as described in the preceding paragraph, also serve to intensify 
lobbying within political parties as individuals compete for positions that will put 
them in line for deployment and promotion to government. Studying the ANC and 
DA constitutions, it seems political parties follow more or less similar processes in 
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electing party leaders. For the ANC the highest organ is its National Conference 
which sits every five years, and elects the National Executive Committee (NEC) 
which has the task of leading the party between conferences as the highest 
executive body in the organisation. According to the ANC constitution members 
have to satisfy certain conditions to be eligible to stand for election to the NEC. 
Some of these conditions include i) good financial standing ii) individual must have 
been a ANC member for ten years or more iii) only candidates who have been 
proposed by their Provincial Executive Committees (PEC) (ANC, 2012).  
 
PECs are elected by regions, who in turn are elected by branches. The importance 
of branch structures becomes apparent when national conferences are convened 
as, according to the party‟s constitution, “ninety percent of voting delegates shall 
be from branches…[and] the number of delegates per branch shall be in 
proportion to their paid up membership” with the NEC having provided for a fixed 
number expected from each province (ANC, 2012). 
 
With respect to national and provincial elections the NEC has the task of 
appointing a National List Committee whose responsibility is coordinating with 
provincial committees “for the selection and adoption of candidates for national 
Parliament” (ANC, 2012). Ministerial positions are the president‟s prerogative, and 
are appointed from those members who make parliament. Ono (2012:554) makes 
an interesting observation in that “government positions, including cabinet 
portfolios, have long been allocated among factions within the party”.  
 
3.3 Governance 
The ushering in of democratic governments across the African continent has not 
been without challenges, with African scholars agreeing that the liberal democratic 
model may need to be revisited and models suited to African contexts developed. 
Some of the processes which tend to be ambiguous / problematic include 
governance and good governance, which Nanda argues tends to be “unsettled in 
its meaning” (2006:269). Mkandawire defines governance as “the exercise of 
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power to manage a nation‟s affairs” and that in the African context good 
governance would include “the establishment of…developmental, democratic and 
socially inclusive…state-society relations” (2007:679, 680) which is similar to 
Mhone and Edigheji‟s (2003) treatment of the subject. Mkandawire further argues 
that “good governance should be judged by how well it sustains this triad” 
[developmental, democratic and socially inclusive] (2007: 680), versus compliance 
to liberal notions of good governance.  
 
The ANC‟s views on governance seem to be in agreement with Mkandawire‟s 
definition of a developmental state when it says “…efficiency and effectiveness 
require that the size of the public service is in accordance with the needs and 
resources of the country…”, and its commitment “…to strengthen relations 
between government and civil society, including non-governmental and 
community-based organisations; and promote their role in the process of 
transformation…” (ANC, 1992). According to Mkandawire (2007:680) “equity and 
inclusion” contribute to strong state-society relations which are crucial to stability, 
especially in Africa where ethnic conflicts tend to threaten democratic stability.  
 
The ANC adopted cadre deployment as a party political strategy, based on above 
arguments, in order to transform public service particularly with respect to 
“doctrine, composition and its management style”, as well as to control policy 
formulation and implementation in government with the understanding that a 
transformed public service would in turn serve the broader social transformation 
agenda. A combination of cadre deployment and affirmative action policies were 
used as guidelines for transforming the public sector into one representative of 
South African society.  
 
3.4 Role of the Media 
South Africa‟s transformation agenda as discussed above, has experienced an 
uneasy co-existence with the media post 1994. As a consequence prominent 
African scholars agree that a rethinking of the role of media in African democracies 
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is necessary. This is in view of the relationship between media and politics/state 
pre-democracy, requirements of a working democracy as well as the evolving 
political economies associated with media. According to Fourie (2002) the starting 
point would be to understand the relationship between the state, media and 
society within democracies. Opuamie-Ngoa says “…the three essential requisites 
of democracy are a well-informed citizenry, freedom to participate in the decision-
making processes and accountability to the citizens by those who on their behalf 
exercise power” (2010:1). Pre-1994 the media in South Africa was largely seen as 
an apartheid propaganda machine, a tool used by the state to advance its 
„separate development‟ ideology and as a consequence, for media houses to stay 
operational they had to be seen to promote minority politics or risk being banned 
by the state (Chimutengwende, 1978). In explaining the relationship between mass 
media and the state Chimutengwende says “…[the media] are information 
brokers…legitimators of values and institutions in the public arena, conferring 
status and validity, setting the agenda for political and cultural debate…[and they] 
provide a crucial and direct link between the rulers and the general population” 
(1978:44). 
 
Viewed from this perspective and the notion of a mediated political public sphere, 
the role of the media becomes that of an arbiter/moderator/aggregator of ideas 
and information. Willems (2012) problematises the neutrality of this role though 
and Fourie (2002) also argues that, because the role of the media in the new 
South Africa has never been clarified by both players, a similar pattern of conflict / 
adversaries still emerges between government and some media as during 
apartheid. Willems proposes the reason for this state of affairs is “…both media 
institutions and political actors are concerned with attracting a particular readership 
or support base…hence, they share a joint agenda of mobilising popular 
support…” (2012: 104).  Chabani Manganyi argues that media state relations are 
often a tussle/contestation over power and influence over citizens, contestations 
which “…tend to come to the fore during transitions…” (2004:7), wherein political 
elites want to control the framing of issues as this determines public opinion. 
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Chabani Manganyi argues that South Africa‟s transition into democracy “…should 
be recognized as [a valid] framing circumstance for the ongoing transformation of 
South African society” (2004:3) and that media accountability is also a crucial 
element in negotiating new democracies instead of “telling untruths/distorted 
news…[which is a] negative use of its power…” (2004:109). According to Berger 
(2002) and Willems (2012) the role of the media in African democracies has 
largely been based on the Western idea of liberal democracy which glosses over 
the historical realities on the continent and ignores the ideological role of media in 
advancing certain commercial and oppositional agendas.  
 
For South African media this could be further justified by the nature of the liberal, 
and Western inspired constitution that is the foundation of the country‟s 
democracy, as well as opening up of media spaces to global media houses. Fourie 
further explains that using „freedom of expression‟ as a justification for media 
practise in South Africa without questioning the meanings and values attached to 
the concept and their relevance to South Africa‟s transformation and 
developmental agenda (2002: 33, 34) will remain a challenge between the media 
and government. Wasserman is in agreement about the contested role of the 
media in a democratising South Africa when he says “it became clear that the 
responsibilities incumbent upon the media operating in this environment were 
understood differently by different role players...at the core [lies] different views of 
the interests that the media should be serving, as well as diverging definitions of 
the public sphere and the media‟s role in this sphere” (2005:37).   
 
3.4.1 Media and the ANC: Historical context 
The ANC, in its 51st Conference (2002) discussions, acknowledged the power of 
the media and the central role it plays in deepening democracy by informing 
citizens and encouraging citizen participation “…in matters of governance and 
social developments” (ANC, 2002). According to the ANC media contribution to 
deepening democracy would mean citizens are provided with information on “…a 
wide range of political positions on core issues…as well as [providing a platform 
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for] rigorous debates on activities that cover the political, social, cultural and 
economic domains” (ANC, 2002). The ANC thus committed itself to support 
“progressive journalists…with a view towards improving the quality of journalism 
and deepen national debate…and ensure a proper reflection and representation of 
the complex democratic transformation process…” (ANC, 2002). 
 
It is this late attention to transforming the media in general that Teer-Tomaselli 
refers to when she says the new ANC government had focused its media policy 
discussions going into CODESA, on transforming the SABC (1993:227-239) in 
light of the impending political transition. Print media together with online/digital 
media only came into focus in early 2000s when the ANC acknowledged that 
“mass communication can be a very effective way of influencing attitudes and 
opinions…” (ANC, 2002), making these discussions pre-cursors to the muted 
Media Appeals Tribunal as well as what is termed „the secrecy Bill‟.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
Sunset Clause :  A sunset clause is a provision that terminates portions of the law after a specific 
date, unless further laws are made to extend it. In the case of transition 
negotiations, it was the Government of National Unity, for the five years following 
a democratic election, which gave concessions to the National Party with regards 
to power sharing, public service and land redistribution  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ANALYSIS - TRENDS IN NEWS NARRATIVE WITH REGARDS TO POLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES 
4.1  Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 1 under „background and context of research‟, framing of 
South African politics has largely employed liberal democratic discourse which 
focuses on the watchdog role of the media, which has been criticised by some 
scholars including Willems who questions the notion of „good governance‟ and 
„democracy‟ as a „one size fits all‟ proposition globally (2012: 91-92). This criticism 
is extended to the South African media in the view that this watchdog role has 
turned to a ritual expressed in sensationalist reporting of the South African political 
processes, producing reactive and biased news reports with little or no insight into 
socio-economic realities on the ground. The study focused on reports during 2014 
election year which is one of the mandated political transformation processes in 
South Africa. 
 
From coded results of sampled articles tabled in chapter 2 for period under study, 
the biggest number of thematic incidents carried in Mail & Guardian and The 
Sunday Times newspapers were on election related matters, which covered 
information such as IEC readiness, voter registration information, political party 
campaigning efforts and polls conducted by „independent‟ research organisations 
to gauge possible election results. Reporting on themes sometimes overlaps, for 
instance an election report might contain information on either one of the other 
coded themes, or two themes are contained in one report but exclude the election 
theme, for instance service delivery and patronage. This chapter will look at 
reports on specific themes related to some of the transformation processes in 
South Africa, which include elections, service delivery and governance issues. 
Randomly selected articles will also be included from the digital platforms of The 
City Press, The New Age or The Sowetan. The writer has italicised problematic 
words and phrases that have been included in the reports. 
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4.2 Reports – Elections 
Mail & Guardian 
M&G election stories included “What to read into promises” (24-30/01), “Sorry you 
missed Jacksonville, ANC”, “Defacation defection feared” (28/03-03/04/2014), 
“dusty divisions, empty promises” (04/04-10/04/2014), “2014: the lame duck in 
waiting” (17/04-24/04/2014). As with other publications M&G had a „special‟ 
elections feature “SA votes 2014”, wherein all election stories appear. 
 
“Dusty Divisions, empty promises” 04/04-10/04/2014 
The story appears with other election stories under “SA Votes 2014”, and tells of 
activities political parties have embarked on to support those who lost family 
members during the Marikana strike and subsequently the „massacre‟ in 2012. The 
reporter writes about what Lonmin mine has paid out to the two subjects being 
interviewed, their living conditions in Mbizana, whether they will vote and who they 
will vote for. 
 
The Sunday Times 
ST carried a „special‟ elections feature “Election 2014” from March 2014, which 
was after the election date proclamation by the president. These pages carried 
reports on electioneering campaigns of different political parties. Some of the 
headlines read “DA to challenge ANC in court on food parcels; Juju not walking the 
talk with his expensive shoes; Zuma booed by own party in Limpopo; ANC still 
riding high among voters in spite of Nkandla scandal; Mazibuko ready for battle 
after illness; DA‟s young lions braced to battle for plum posts; I won‟t lie for Zuma, 
Vavi warns” (ST 20 & 27/04/2014)  
 
4.3 Reports – Service Delivery  
Mail & Guardian 
M&G carried a report on “ANC in jobs-for-votes probe” where it is reported 
temporary jobs for youth were created by economic development MEC in North 
West (24-30/01/2014), “A R176-million jobs for youth programme has pitted the 
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ANC leadership in the North West against colleagues in the provincial government 
ahead of this year‟s election, in the latest example of a two-centres-of-power 
struggle…”. According to the report two points of contestation arose due to this 
programme, first from the provincial ANC leadership who branded it factional as 
“criteria for selection and lists…” were compiled by certain councillors without the 
knowledge of other politicians. Secondly the reporter says “the rise of the former 
ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema‟s EFF is said to be one of the reasons 
why the ANC provincial government is trying hard to lure young people with 
temporary jobs…”    
 
ST‟s first report is titled “Where blood flows thicker than water”, describing how 
residents were killed during a recent service delivery protest, where dirty water 
was the issue of contention. Words used in the report include “…despite the 
prevalence of mines in the area unemployment is rife and disillusioned youth say 
they have to pay bribes…to get a job…municipal jobs and tenders are reserved for 
those connected to ANC leaders, locals say…this allegedly includes about R1.3 
million spent every month on private trucks to routinely deliver water to 
communities…some say the lethargy in addressing their plight is designed to 
ensure that politically connected pals continue to benefit from it…” 
 
Another report carried in ST (09/03) on how retirement villages and old age home 
residents were affected by electricity cuts, “…the government stands accused of 
failing to implement an emergency security plan devised three years ago by key 
energy stakeholders, including the country‟s 100 biggest companies, which would 
have helped to avoid blackouts…”. Another report linked to energy issues in the 
country was titled “Fury at ESKOM décor spree: Utility blows half a billion to 
spruce up head office as winter blackouts loom” (ST, 27/04/2014). The report 
opens with “Cash strapped Eskom is splashing out R500 million to give its head 
office a lavish face lift – while seeking a bailout of up to R50 billion from the South 
African tax payer…” 
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4.4 Reports – Governance 
The biggest governance issue carried in both newspapers during this period was 
government‟s (and especially the president‟s) response to Public Protector‟s report 
on the president‟s private residence upgraded at a cost of about R250 million to 
the taxpayer. The reports carry pictures of the site, comment and analysis on the 
Public Protector‟s report (ST, 23/03 30/03/2014; M&G, 03/01 10/01/2014). The 
report in M&G “ANC swigs Nkandla Kool Aid”, wherein it is reported that ANC NEC 
members “accepted Jacob Zuma‟s explanation that he did not personally ask for 
the upgrades…that a revolt against Zuma over the matter from within the party is 
unlikely…Zuma is the face of the [party‟s] campaign...”. Those asked for comment 
on the report, Lindiwe Zulu and Gwede Mantashe, commented that “…the ANC 
would push for the [Public Protector‟s] report to be released as soon as 
possible…if Madonsela failed to release the report before the elections, her 
conduct would be read as political…if [released] close to the elections, we will 
actually assume it will be intended to tilt the balance of forces in the election…” 
 
The M&G (17-23/01/2014) reported on a story where ANC colours (green, gold 
and black) were used for Gauteng government‟s billboard adverts “Gauteng ads 
show ANC‟s true colours” instead of the provincial government‟s colours (blue, 
gold and grey). The main question asked by the journalist is “whether public funds 
were used to fund a government campaign that opposition parties maintain was 
masquerading as an ANC campaign ahead of the 2014 election”. This speaks 
directly to blurring of lines between state and party, and DA spokesperson in 
Gauteng is quoted as calling it “another subversive form of state capture…and 
likened it to the ANC handing out food parcels paid for by the government close to 
election times…”. The journalist includes two pieces of information as opinion, 
firstly that using ANC colours in the campaign „may‟ have boosted Mokonyane‟s 
profile with the ANC national leadership. Secondly, that incumbent premier 
Nomvula Mokonyane “needs all the help she can get, because her position as 
Gauteng premier is tenuous…she is reported to be too low down on the province‟s 
list of preferred leaders…” (M&G, 2013)    
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4.5 Analysis 
Elections reports 
The tone of ST election reports tends to be soft on DA candidates, and appears to 
even support court action by the DA against the ruling party, including complaints 
laid with the Public Protector‟s office. On the other hand ST is very quick to point 
out the negatives / shortcomings of the ruling party as well as newly formed EFF. 
The reports are silent on what the agreed upon procedures are in relation to food 
parcels and electioneering, or boundaries regarding government / political party 
activities. Again on reporting about individual character traits of EFF leader (…the 
silver buckle of his Louis Vuitton shoes gleamed in the sun…the expensive pair of 
shoes stubbornly offers proof of his old lifestyle…Malema later told journalists EFF 
leaders would lead „ordinary‟ lives…before racing away in a Mercedes Benz 
S350…) rather than the content of his party‟s ideology/manifesto, seems to tell 
readers what to think about Malema as a leader. The silences / gaps in these 
reports can easily be interpreted as failures in the government system and that 
politicians and political parties are only interested in votes. 
 
The story carried in M&G is silent on what responsibility the local municipality 
should be taking for service delivery, what their budgeting, planning processes and 
time frames are regarding service delivery for the area. The perception created is 
that the ruling party is not fulfilling its responsibilities towards residents but is after 
their votes come election time. News narrative around election period also 
includes polling or surveys, which is unrelated to transformation processes. 
Newspapers publish stories based on survey results conducted by „independent‟ 
research companies on voter sentiment regarding election climate. The story titled 
“ANC still riding high among voters in spite of Nkandla scandal” 20/04/2014 is an 
example of such reports. 
 
Service delivery reports 
What is salient with the M&G story is the struggle between party politics and 
government in delivering services, and the notion that service provision can and 
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should decide voter behaviour at election which is libertarian in its logic. The 
reports in general do not take into account other contexts that could decide voter 
behaviour in the South African context, for example those discussed under 
literature review section. The ST report focuses on how retirement villages and old 
age home residents were affected by electricity cuts, but fails to give details of the 
said emergency plan and how government „has failed‟ to implement said plan.  
 
Governance reports 
With the governance reports, there is little that the papers ignored as every issue 
carried an item on Nkandla expenditure. It is curious though that after elections the 
salience of the Nkandla issue diminished, as if it was meant to influence voter 
behaviour.  
4.6 Conclusion  
ST has reported service delivery issues such as public safety (or justice) 
(05/01/2014), provision of water (19/01/2014) and energy issues (09/03/2014) as 
non-delivery of services with corruption in government and state owned 
enterprises to blame. With the Eskom story ST creates the impression that Eskom 
has misplaced priorities which results in wasteful spending of tax payers‟ money. 
M&G on the other hand devotes a lot of column space going into detail in reports, 
comments and analyses, and becomes sensationalist in the tone of their lead 
pages. Reading these reports with a critical eye, one is persuaded there are gaps 
of information left out by writers, in order to create a certain perception about 
government efficiency and casting doubt on government capacity or willingness to 
deliver services. 
 
Reports in both newspapers are within a frame of zero executive accountability 
where fiscal and public funds are concerned, and re-enforcing the perception that 
politicians are only accountable to their respective parties rather than voters 
through constitutional bodies. The prominence of the Nkandla issue leading up to 
elections, and how it started fading after elections, may point to print media‟s 
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agenda setting role but also portrays how media‟s watchdog role is vital for 
deepening democratic rule. 
 
What also seems to be curious with print media is use of faceless sources, except 
to say „a source close to the NEC / investigation / a highly placed source‟. This 
practise may be part of newspaper production that sources are protected at all 
times, but with time and with the discourses manifesting in print media (which is 
self-regulated) this may be one of the reasons government is calling for a Media 
Appeals Tribunal.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ANALYSIS - MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF ELECTION LISTS AND CADRE 
DEPLOYMENT VERSUS INTENT OF THE PROCESS 
5.1 Context  
Why has the media tended to focus on personalities and not the intent of cadre 
deployment as a process towards transformation? News stories on election lists 
and cadre deployment reveal patterns of some editorial processes which include 
selection and content management, which according to framing theory shows 
intentional behaviour by media. Accordingly, the editorial practise provokes 
intense debates in which the rationality of liberal-objective-observer to 
democratic process is criticized by thinking which argues that such rationality 
remains trapped by a devotion to „liberalist rituals‟, rituals detached from 
embedded meanings specific to South Africa‟s socio-political dynamics.    
 
As discussed in chapter 3, South Africa‟s transformation imperatives set out in 
the constitution, taken together with the country‟s electoral system, give rise to 
the context of deployment in government. This has also been a key factor within 
the ruling party‟s internal elections processes, as it takes precaution to ensure 
representation of different provinces based on branch membership, as well as 
representation and appointment of women to strategic positions within the party 
and to government. The proportional representative system has ensured that 
voters vote for political parties and each political party chooses members who will 
serve as its representatives in parliament based on the party lists. 
 
The ANC‟s cadre policy is supposed to serve as a guide in deploying members 
into strategic positions in government and state owned enterprises (ANC online). 
The party has re-iterated its commitment to the 1985 cadre policy when it 
declared 1997 “the year for re-affirming the ANC cadre” and the declaration at its 
53rd National Conference of “the decade of the Cadre”. At this conference the 
ruling party recommitted itself to a kind of cadre that is “ideologically rooted and 
schooled in ANC politics; skilled and competent to undertake assigned tasks; 
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disciplined; ethical; and conscientious” (ANC, December 2014). It is important to 
note the different set of skills required for a political deployee and a 
technical/public service deployee, the former required to be a member of the 
ruling party while the latter needs to be sympathetic to the party‟s ideology AND 
technically skilled in their field. For example Thuli Madonsela (Public Protector) 
would be a public service deployee in this instance. 
 
5.2  Reports 
The first issue of Mail and Guardian during period of study carried a report on 
postponement of the ANC national list conference (03-09/01/2014) citing Keith 
Khoza, ANC spokesperson and Lindiwe Zulu, head of ANC sub-committee on 
communications as denying internal factions as the cause of postponement. 
Interestingly the same report cites an unnamed source who is “a senior member 
of the party in the Western Cape” as saying “a large number of ANC members 
stop campaigning for the party if their names did not appear high enough…”. 
 
A ST (16/03) report on ANC party list titled “Internal power play trumps voter 
choice”, and reads “the recently released ANC candidate list for parliament 
reveals more about the party‟s future and its present status than many of us 
realise…”. The author explains „future‟ as the capacity to predict/read future 
succession battles that are likely to play out internally, based on the current 
candidate list. The party‟s present status speaks to a number of names included 
on the list who have appeared before a parliamentary ethics committee and have 
been found guilty of fraud but, according to the ruling party, were never convicted 
by a court of law. What the report is salient on is question the credibility of some 
ANC candidates and re-inforce the assertion that candidates are accountable to 
the party and not the voter.  
 
Both newspapers report on cabinet appointments in one issue each (M&G 30/05 
– 05/06/2014; ST 01/06/2014). ST headlined the report “No easy wait for their 
cabinet nod: phones of the chosen start ringing before dawn”. The writer tells of 
  
38 
 
“nervous cabinet ministers party[ing] the night away at the house of their 
colleague…ministers and ANC NEC members who were hoping to be appointed 
to Zuma‟s cabinet gathered…but as the hours went by without a call from the 
president‟s office, the party became a sombre affair…”. M&G on the other hand 
reported on cabinet appointments under a feature “ministerial merry-go-round” 
(30/05-05/06/2014), where they focus on David Mahlobo‟s appointment to head 
State Security, the re-deployment of Nathi Mthethwa to Arts and Culture portfolio, 
Nkosinathi Nhleko‟s appointment as Police Minister, their past performances and 
what they are expected to deliver.  
 
5.3 Analysis 
In all the newspapers interest in candidates and party lists has not been a strong 
focal point except when it relates to the ruling party and the candidates‟ credibility 
to hold office. Party lists and deployment discourse is once again held within 
libertarian frames that find fault at the first instance with proportional 
representation, which is a constitutional imperative towards transformation, and 
cadre deployment. What is lacking with both newspapers is an outline of all 
ministerial appointments, their skills and qualifications/experience for that 
particular portfolio and what their duties will involve. Instead M&G recreates the 
perception alluded to under 1.3.2 above that appointments made within the 
Security Cluster are biased towards the president. By selecting to report on 
Mahlobo‟s and Nhleko‟s appointments, and Mthethwa‟s re-deployment to Arts 
and Culture, M&G is highlighting how Zuma is appointing based on, and 
rewarding, his ethnic group or reward loyalists from KZN.    
 
It is also interesting to note newspaper sources and their anonymity, while it is 
understandable that journalists want to protect their sources, this can be 
interpreted to mean any number of things. Firstly, it could mean political parties 
have moles who are feeding journalists with internal information which would 
explain the roping in of state intelligence in monitoring party members. Secondly, 
it could mean the journalist is making up the story and so to subvert the need to 
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test its veracity and give it credibility, a source close to internal party processes is 
„quoted‟. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The media can be forgiven in some instances for highlighting 
personality/character flaws when it comes to ANC deployees, which speaks to its 
watchdog role, even though this is never based on the „cadre policy‟ but comes 
across as western inspired reporting which tends to be personality driven versus 
issues driven, and frames politicians as self-serving. The narrative of a corrupt 
ANC government goes even further to sound racial in its tone, suggesting a 
government led by black people will always fail. By its own admission, the ANC 
has conceded that some of its deployees “…forgot ANC politics and started to 
think only about themselves…[once placed in their new roles which gave them 
access to the resources of the state]…” (ANC, December 2014).  
 
Media discourse on deployment, as mentioned in chapter 1, seems to silently 
contradict itself when deployment success stories are attributed solely to 
individuals, yet reports on poor performance malign the whole cadre deployment 
process. An example of a successful deployment is in the Office of the Public 
Protector under Thuli Madonsela which has increasingly been attributed to her as 
an individual. This is where mediated politics becomes a challenge for politicians 
and society, as those with the means to broadcast or publish information 
ultimately control what reality is perceived. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ANALYSIS – HOW DO MEDIA REPORTS TREAT INDIVIDUAL 
DEPLOYMENTS DIFFERENTLY? 
6.1 Context 
If cadre deployment as a process is so flawed, why the contradictory reporting 
when it comes to individual deployees? Media discourse on deployment, as 
mentioned in chapter 1 and chapter 5, seems to silently contradict itself when 
deployment success stories are attributed solely to individuals, yet reports on 
poor performance malign the whole cadre deployment process. These media 
representations tend to magnify or focus on failed or failing departments on the 
basis of incompetent and unqualified cadres deployed to management positions, 
whilst understating successful deployment. 
  
6.2 Administrative / Public Service Appointments 
Thuli Madonsela – Adv. Thulisile (Thuli) Nomkhosi Madonsela is the Public 
Protector of South Africa, a position she has occupied for over 5 years. She is 
the third Public Protector and first woman to occupy the position, appointed by 
the President with effect from 15 October 2009 following a unanimous vote by all 
parties represented in Parliament (Public Protector online).   
 
Madonsela was brought into the spotlight during election year by her earlier 
investigation into state expenditure into Nkandla (the President‟s private 
residence) and subsequent release of her report in the same year. Both M&G 
and ST carry sections from, and analysis of the report. M&G (20-27/03/2014) 
went further by elevating her findings by saying “…this is why her findings carry 
greater significance than the others…”, noting that there had been two other 
investigations by government related entities. Aside from the Nkandla 
investigation, Madonsela is painted as a hero for the ordinary citizen in both 
newspapers. M&G carry a report titled “Madonsela puts „Gogo Dlamini‟ first” (20-
27/03/2014) and reads “High-profile issues aside, 95% of the protector‟s cases 
deal with the complaints of ordinary citizens”. M&G goes into detail about the 
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work of the public protector and what resources are lacking in that particular 
office, but it conveniently remains silent over the fact that she is a deployee. 
 
ST (23/03/2014) ran a leader page “I feared for my life” in one of their reports on 
Public Protector‟s report into Nkandla, wherein a picture of what resistance she 
had to face (from those in government, and statements from politicians about her 
office published in the media) during the investigation is painted. The report is 
also conveniently silent on the fact that Madonsela is a deployee, a ANC member 
who has been involved in the liberation struggle. Even articles that appear on 
News 24 (City Press Online), appear to paint a picture of a lone „voice of reason‟ 
in the person of the Public Protector standing against the ruling party on issues of 
governance. 
 
Riah Phiyega – Phiyega was appointed by President Zuma in June 2012, 
replacing Bheki Cele who had been fired from the position (SAPS online). In 
August 2012 she had to deal with the events that unfolded at Marikana involving 
Lonmin Mine and striking workers, where upon about 40 people lost their lives. 
The media has generally apportioned blame to Phiyega for the deaths at 
Marikana, as she made the final decision for the type of police action that 
resulted. She is currently under suspension by the President pending a 
commission of inquiry into her fitness to hold office, as a consequence to 
Marikana events. Her biography shows she has not worked with SAPS before 
although qualified in Social Sciences (who‟s who in SA online).  
 
ST (2014) carried a report titled “Phiyega leads police in splurge” in which 
phrases such as “…Phiyega took 1500 South African Police Service managers 
on a three day junket to Durban this week at a cost of more than R3 million…they 
stayed at expensive hotels…and enjoyed a R490 000 dinner…the lavish 
treatment appears to have been in defiance of instructions by the Treasury to 
government departments to cut down on spending…” (ST, 09/02/2014). Towards 
the end of the report mention is made of the reason for this meeting – a 
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conference on public order policing, followed by SAPS spokesperson defending 
the expenditure as having been budgeted for. 
Hlaudi Motsoeneng – Motsoeneng is currently the Chief Operations Officer 
(COO) of the Public Broadcaster, and admits himself that he does not have a 
matric certificate nor post matric qualification for his task. Yet qualified personnel 
who have formed part of the SABC board and those who held Group Chief 
Executive Officer (GCEO) position since he came in as GE: Stakeholder 
Relations (Mokhobo, Matlala) have either resigned or have been fired. M&G 
reports in its news item titled “Never mind Thuli, long may Hlaudi reign, says 
SABC chief” (21-27/02/2014) wherein Board chairperson Ellen Tshabalala is 
reported to have defended Motsoeneng against Public Protector‟s findings of 
fraud and financial irregularities, and said “Hlaudi is diligent and very 
capable…members of the board are right behind him…”. On Motsoeneng issue, 
print media has not been incorrect in their reportage, mainly because their 
sources have been internal to the SABC. The perception created around 
Motsoeneng‟s appointment and activities is within the frame of deployment 
towards state capture, the controlling of frames / perceptions to the majority 
(please see section on political economy of the media in chapter 7) of media 
consumers in South Africa and the arrogance that goes with it.   
 
6.3 Political 
Jacob Zuma – Having been re-elected as ANC president in Mangaung, 2012, 
Jacob Zuma retained the number one position to become the state president 
should the party win elections in 2014. The media focus pre-election was on 
Nkandla and party attempts to protect the man from dissenting voices within. 
News report headlines such as “Zuma shielded against the boos” (ST, 
12/01/2014), “President delays Nkandla report” (ST, 09/02/2014), “State paid for 
homes of Zuma‟s family” (ST, 23/03/2014), “President parties up a storm as 
guest at Cape Town jazz festival: Zuma shows no sign of Nkandla stress as he 
mingles with VIPs at social event” (ST, 30/03/2014) and “Zuma wants R2bn town 
in his backyard” (ST, 04/05/2014) all seem to suggest reasons for voters to vote 
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against the ruling party come election time as the President shows zero 
accountability to the voter. ST reports intermittently on Zuma post-election, but 
focus on some of his cabinet choices and their capabilities.     
 
Aaron Motsoaledi – Dr. Motsoaledi, Minister of Health since 2009, is a medical 
doctor by training who studied at University of Natal and hails from Limpopo 
(ANC online). Dr. Motsoaledi has rarely attracted negative media reporting, and 
instead has been represented as one who knows what his portfolio entails, and 
knows how to engage industry professions from doctors, pharmaceutical 
companies and medical aid schemes. Of the reports pulled online on Motsoaledi, 
only one seems to be initiated by the opposition “Babies at risk of contracting TB 
due to BCG vaccine shortage, says DA” (Sunday Times Online, September 
2015). In other reports Motsoaledi is represented as a Minister willing to admit 
government failures and willing to open up to the media in his responses. What is 
of interest is how the report in City Press “State hands out R10bn ARV tenders” 
is written. Four pharmaceutical companies were awarded this tender, Sonke 
Pharmaceuticals (India/SA), Mylan Pharmaceuticals (US), Aspen Pharma 
(SA/US) and Cipla Medpro (India) and nothing untoward is insinuated or implied 
about the ownership of these companies, unlike when reporting about BEE deals 
that benefit from state tenders (City Press Online, December 2014 & Business 
Report, September 2015). 
 
M&G also ran a story “From critical condition to stable: the nation‟s healthcare 
system reflects the actions of the ministers responsible for it over the years” 
(11/04 – 17/04/2014). This report brings focus on three ministers who have been 
responsible for the health department since President Mandela to the current 
President Zuma and what their policy focus has been. “Motsoaledi‟s HIV 
progressive policies and anticipated NHI system” seem to be the most focused 
on by the industry. 
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Malusi Gigaba – The M&G article “Gigaba‟s spin hits the skids on patronage” 17-
24/04/2014 profiles Gigaba, then Public Enterprises Minister, as a „media darling‟ 
who is „clearly bothered‟ by cronyism and dismal management. The article also 
appears under the SA Votes 2014 feature. The writer chronicles how difficult it is 
to secure interviews with senior ANC figures, bar Malusi Gigaba „the party‟s 
official head of campaigns is the closest thing the ANC has to a media darling, 
and he is ever ready and able…[he is] the prince in waiting, and sometimes 
headboy‟. Gigaba is interviewed as ANC spin-doctor going into the elections. The 
writer ends the story with a line “But…the ANC…is stuck with a deeply 
compromised leader…but with leaders like Gigaba softening the edges it is 
determined to bolster, polish and push Zuma through the elections…and after 
that? The king must make good on all this work, or make way for the princes in 
the wings…”   
 
6.4 Conclusions of Analysis 
Looking at reports on the political deployees as informed by political competition, 
the focus is on their character flaws or positives depending on how the candidate 
responds to the media, corporate South Africa‟s or opposition parties‟ demands 
from that portfolio. Reports on public service appointments seem to paint a 
picture of candidates who are generally not qualified and landed their positions 
through their proximity to the ruling party and the president (ST, 23/02/2014), and 
therefore do not have a grasp of their duties or are prone to misuse public 
resources (ST, 09/02/2014). Thuli Madonsela as Public Protectors is an example 
of a successful deployment but this has been attributed to her as an individual 
Mandonsela has proceeded with investigations into some controversial issues 
that did not favour the ruling party and delivered her reports without favour. Print 
media has framed her as a heroine and a victim of ANC corrupt power games, 
and appropriate her as a beacon of good governance, then distance her from the 
ANC and freedom struggle credentials through omitting this particular 
information. Exceptions also include Dr. Motsoaledi and Gigaba, who is framed 
as a possible contender to the succession battle after Zuma leaves office.   
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CHAPTER 7 
WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THESE TRENDS IN REPRESENTATIONS AND 
WHY? 
7.1 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
One of the main factors that contribute to media discourse and framing is the 
political economy (patterns of ownership and control) of the media. Minister of 
Communications, Faith Muthambi, has recently decried the negative 
representations in the media of the ruling party, which she says are due to lack of 
transformation within print media, “…sadly, ownership is still very much 
concentrated among a few companies…ownership and content still lack 
diversity…” (Muthambi, 2016). She was reported in Business Tech (2016) as 
having said “…media transformation has now taken [priority] in her department‟s 
plans for the year, where it will address media ownership, as well as ownership 
of the printing press, distribution channels and regulatory bodies…” 
 
Herman and Chomsky (1988:298) have also earlier argued that “…the „societal 
purpose‟ of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and 
political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the 
state… through selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, 
filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping debate within the 
bounds of acceptable premises [discourse]...”. According to Opuamie-Ngoa 
“media content is a reflection of practitioners and their organizations [with] 
content chosen by identifiable interests in determining which issues to „raise‟ in 
the public mind...issues that conform to the interests of the power structures of 
which they are a part, and which they serve...stakeholders who in turn measure 
performance of media companies along the lines of sales volume, accruals from 
advertising and profits as opposed to public interest concerns about creativity, 
independent thought and diversity...” (2010:7,8).  
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How does is this manifest in South African media? Print media in South Africa is 
dominated by four large media companies and publishers - Independent Media, 
Times Media Group, Naspers and Caxton. These media houses have diverse 
interests which include digital platforms, broadcasting as well as print 
(newspapers, magazines and books) and publishing. Below is an overview of 
what platforms each group owns:  
 
Independent Media 
Independent Media‟s stable includes The Star in Johannesburg, Cape Times and 
Cape Argus in Cape Town and The Mercury in Durban. Their magazines include 
GQ South Africa with Independent Online (IOL) as their digital news platform 
(http://www.independentmedia.co.za/en/our-company/about-us/). 
  
Independent Media‟s website lists “Sekunjalo Media Consortium, The 
Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) through The Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC), Interacom Investment Holding Limited - China International 
Television Corporation (CITVC) and China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADFUND)” as shareholders in the company. Change in ownership is as recent 
as 2013, the media group having been bought from an Ireland based company 
(http://www.independentmedia.co.za/en/our-company/about-us/).  
 
Naspers Group 
Naspers owns Media24 which has in its stable titles such as The City Press, 
Beeld, Die Burger and Rapport. Below is a structure that shows which properties 
Naspers owns across different media.  
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Caxton 
Caxton‟s major newspaper is The Citizen, with a number of magazines in their 
stable. The group also has diverse interests in “publishing and printing 
newspapers, magazines, commercial print, book printing, stationery, packaging 
and labels, as well as manufacturing ink for web presses”. The group was 
founded in 1980 by Terry Moolman and Noel Coburn, and still belongs to the 
Moolman Family (http://www.caxton.co.za/about/).  
 
Mail & Guardian 
“In the early 1990s, the Guardian newspaper group in London became the 
largest shareholder…in 2002, the Guardian reduced its shareholding to 10% and 
sold the majority share at 87,5% to Zimbabwean media owner and entrepreneur 
Trevor Ncube…” (M&G online). The Mail & Guardian considers its readers as 
“niche…interested in a critical approach to politics, arts and current affairs…large 
numbers of readers among professionals, academics, diplomats, lobbyists, non-
governmental groups…” (http://mg.co.za/page/about-us/)  
  
TNA Media (Pty) Ltd 
TNA Media owns one newspaper The New Age which started printing in 2011, 
and its shareholders have interests in the 24 hour news channel African News 
Network7 (ANN7). Its shareholders include the Gupta brothers who have been 
shown to have links to President Zuma.  
 
Print media is all privately owned and relying entirely on advertising revenue for 
its operations, existence and survival. The last two have been included due to 
their independence from the major players and to show how ownership and 
control in South Africa is changing, and with it editorial content. What this 
overview also highlights is how the increasing concentration of ownership, control 
and content within the international media environment is reflected in the local 
industry. Also what is interesting to note is that these newspapers are read by no 
more than a fifth of the population although most boast to cater to all sectors of 
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the South African population, and this point is to be further addressed under 
„ideological‟ and „commercial‟ sections below. 
  
Total 
(Adults 
in SA) 
Sunday 
Times 
Mail & 
Guardian 
(Fri) 
City Press 
(Sun) 
Sowetan The 
Herald 
The New 
Age 
Total 37,665 3,436 535 1,821 1,674 196 *153 
LSM 1 682 **0 **0 **0 **5 **0 **0 
LSM 2 1,363 **2 **0 **0 **5 **0 **0 
LSM 3 2,160 **26 **4 **17 **27 **0 **0 
LSM 4 4,488 **101 **11 **76 **88 **3 **0 
LSM 5 6,129 212 **21 *192 *236 **8 **17 
LSM 6 8,764 655 **78 481 440 *47 **27 
LSM 7 4,719 569 *92 325 328 *41 **30 
LSM 8 3,248 506 *67 286 213 **24 **23 
LSM 9 3,661 751 132 292 207 *39 **26 
LSM 10 2,452 614 131 152 *123 *33 **29 
(Audience) 
 
  
Total Sunday 
Times 
Mail & 
Guardian 
(Fri) 
City Press 
(Sun) 
Sowetan The 
Herald 
The New 
Age 
LSM 1 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
LSM 2 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
LSM 3 5.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 
LSM 4 11.9 2.9 2.1 4.2 5.3 1.5 0.0 
LSM 5 16.3 6.2 3.9 10.6 14.1 3.9 11.3 
LSM 6 23.3 19.1 14.5 26.4 26.3 24.1 17.9 
LSM 7 12.5 16.6 17.1 17.8 19.6 21.1 19.9 
LSM 8 8.6 14.7 12.5 15.7 12.8 12.3 15.3 
LSM 9 9.7 21.9 24.7 16.0 12.4 20.2 16.7 
LSM 10 6.5 17.9 24.5 8.4 7.4 16.9 18.8 
    (Reach %) 
(Source: AMPS 2014) 
 
7.2 Ideological 
Ideology also plays a part in influencing how different groups, and what issues, 
are represented in the media. Ideology can also be linked to ownership and 
control as Opuamie-Ngoa has been quoted in section 7.1, “…media content is a 
reflection of practitioners and their organizations [with] content chosen by 
identifiable interests in determining which issues to „raise‟ in the public 
mind...issues that conform to the interests of the power structures of which they 
are a part, and which they serve...” (2010:7). According to the ANC (n.d.) “…the 
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media in South Africa is shaped by the same political, social and economic 
forces which have shaped society over decades, while at the same time 
contributing in various ways to the development of these forces…”. These are in 
the backdrop that under the apartheid government the media in general has been 
seen as supportive of the dominant ideology of the time, with few media houses 
inside the country having played a role in challenging that ideology. Those that 
challenged the ideology faced government bans or harassment in order for 
dissent to be suppressed. 
 
The ANC seems to view the media as still continuing to support white capital 
which is resistant to the transformation agenda and argues that “…it is therefore 
not surprising that … opponents of transformation regard state structures over 
which they do not have any influence as a threat to the maintenance of the status 
quo” (ANC, 2012). In its document „the battle of ideas‟, the ruling party notes how 
“promotion of market fundamentalism, neo-liberalism, a weak and passive state, 
and overemphasis on individual rights, to retain the old apartheid economic and 
social relations…”, and is part of a global offensive against the ruling party‟s 
ideology of “a developmental state, collective rights, values of caring and 
community, solidarity, non-sexism and non-racialism…” (ANC, 2012). 
 
This speaks to a media that conforms to western liberal notions of democracy, 
and works to promote those ideas. Add to this the fact that journalism curriculum 
is based on western inspired models of learning about the profession. Thamm 
(2015), a journalist who regularly contributes to The Daily Maverick‟s online 
platform, seems to confirm this when she says “The myth of the objective 
journalist has long been shattered...it never existed…journalists are human and 
by nature gravitate towards specific ideologies and ways of thinking shaped by a 
myriad of influences and factors…we are not blank slates…ultimately, however, 
our job is to monitor and to hold power to account…” (DM, 2015). The question 
becomes: monitor and hold power to account against whose standards? 
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7.3 Constructing Power / Power in Discourse 
As discussed under theoretical framework, language through discourse, is the 
tool used to represent a „perceived reality‟ and that “all [discourse analysis 
approaches] share the starting point that our ways of talking do not neutrally 
reflect our world, identities and social relations but…play an active role in 
creating and changing them” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:1), so does Foucault‟s 
theory of power add an interesting dimension to analysing media representation 
of transformational politics in South Africa.   
 
South African politics, mediated as they are, provide fertile ground for power 
struggles in representations. Recently, public debate is laced with certain 
sections of South African society who display certain nostalgia for the “clean” 
apartheid regime. This is due largely to “public perception that a democratic 
South Africa is more corrupt than the apartheid regime dominat[ing] much of the 
public discourse for a number of years after 1994” according to van Vuuren 
(2006:3). South African media, due to its position as a political player and 
information arbiter where politics are concerned, gains itself some form of 
political power which has implications for perceptions and reality created through 
language used in representations of South African political processes.   
 
 
7.4 Commercial 
The political economy section above also sought to highlight how the media 
operates, and has already been mentioned print media relies entirely on 
advertising revenue for its operations, existence and survival. Again to quote 
Opuamie-Ngoa, “…media content is a reflection of practitioners and their 
organizations [with] content chosen by identifiable interests in determining which 
issues to „raise‟ in the public mind...issues that conform to the interests of the 
power structures of which they are a part, and which they serve...stakeholders 
who in turn measure performance of media companies along the lines of sales 
volume, accruals from advertising and profits as opposed to public interest 
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concerns about creativity, independent thought and diversity...” (2010:7,8). There 
is a constant commercial transaction wherein the media sells audiences to 
advertisers. Audiences are categorized/segmented into different markets based 
on living styles (living standards measurements – LSMs), class positions, 
employment status, education, lifestyle attitudes and other indicators. These are 
then translated to the economic power they command as target groups 
measured by the disposable income they have. Advertisers who buy these 
segmented markets as audiences are mainly interested in their disposable 
income.  
 
Media planners and buyers place advertisers‟ messages in the selected media to 
catch this disposable income. Needless to say, it is not all segments of the South 
African population that are of interest to advertisers due to their socio-economic 
position, and this is evidenced by the two tables under the section „political 
economy…‟ above. Media that addresses itself to these South Africans tends to 
stand little or no chance to survive. The broadcasting sector also serves as a 
good example in this instance. SABC radio does not attract as much advertising 
revenue as privately owned commercial radio such as East Coast Radio or 
Highveld, despite the millions of listeners they enjoy over the commercial stations 
(Mediashop, 2015). To quote Buku in an article he wrote for The Daily Maverick, 
“…readership segmentation is important, as advertisers are interested in selling 
their products to those who can afford their products, which are mostly found in 
the higher living standard measures...the middle and upper classes…when these 
groups have a particular ideological inclination, newspapers tend to report based 
on their needs in order to avoid losing their support and thus advertisers” (Buku, 
2015) 
 
This reliance on advertising revenue therefore has the potential to influence 
media considerations of what market to target, what content to deal with and 
what perspectives are reflected. As media ownership and control changes in the 
country, it seems government is also playing in the field through its investment 
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arm PIC for example purchasing Independent News, as well as the decision to 
place more government advertising in government sympathetic media houses – 
for example The New Age.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
  Research Question 
Does South African media framing of the relationship between elections and 
cadre deployment, shape political engagements among the electorate and other 
political stakeholders in post 1994 South Africa‟s quest for transformation? 
 
The study set out to interrogate media discourse on political competition and the 
associated cadre deployment processes, and in so doing contribute to 
scholarship of the media‟s role in post 1994 transformational processes within 
South African politics, beyond the study of media rituals around the watchdog 
function premised on freedom of expression. The study did not seek to excuse 
failures where party lists have brought in persons who have not delivered on their 
constitutional mandates, nor excuse misuse of cadre deployment in pursuance of 
clientelism. Rather it was an examination at the tendency and ritual to summarily 
dismiss the imperative of transformation through ritualistic libertarian reporting.  
 
The study revealed that media cannot be neutral in how it produces news texts 
and speaks about political power firstly due to ownership and control patterns as 
well as serving different ideological and commercial interests. Secondly because 
language as a tool for discourse is a social construct in itself, dependent on and 
yet re-creating social relations. Thirdly news texts are an interpretation, a 
representation, of socio-political phenomena by media institutions and 
practitioners – a process informed by choices and decision of what to include and 
exclude in a text. In the end these processes contribute towards generating 
“knowledge” and “truth” after audiences have engaged with news texts in the 
process of meaning-making.   
 
What the study also revealed is how transformation discourse, which legitimates 
cadre deployment, is at odds with libertarian discourse, which legitimates 
meritocracy while dismissing South Africa‟s apartheid history and transition into 
  
55 
 
democracy. Within this libertarian media discourse three frames became evident: 
corruption, non-accountability and non-delivery of services. It was also of great 
interest to discover the dynamics of a power struggle between the ruling elite and 
the media to control representation and therefore attempting to shape public 
perception and public engagement on South Africa‟s democratic processes. 
 
At times language media use to represent the ruling elite made it difficult to 
separate fact from opinion as texts seemed overladen with priming language. On 
the other hand it does not assist that the ruling party by its behavior somehow 
also plays into these kinds of representations. To quote Grootes (2015) in an 
article he wrote for The Daily Maverick “…that Nkandla, corruption, and scandal 
after scandal about the ANC dominate today's news agenda is not due to any 
inherent fault of the media...it wasn't the Sunday Times that picked Jacob Zuma 
to be president...it wasn't Business Day that decided the Guptas should fly into 
Waterkloof...it wasn't the Mail & Guardian that decided to build Nkandla...these 
complaints are really a lament that people in the ANC did the wrong thing, and 
then got caught doing it…” (DM, 2015). It is possible such reporting may intensify 
perceptions of corruption and nepotism, and that public office is a ticket for one to 
„get a chance to eat at the table‟, thus redefine political competition and original 
intent of cadre deployment in the mind of the voter. 
 
There are some sections of the media industry though who argue against this 
sole watchdog role of the media, but are made out to look like government 
lapdogs. Mbindwane (2015) recently asked a question in his article which 
appeared in The Daily Maverick “Who Watches the Watchdog?” when one of the 
newsroom heads of privately owned media‟s past dealings with the apartheid 
regime surfaced. He says “…globally, politicians envy the media…the media has 
power yet it is unelected...[which] demands that the media be careful in its 
dealings, in its editorial policies and indeed its ethics…wars can be launched via 
media reports...peace can be had via media…South Africa is in the political 
space created by shifting interdependencies among political actors, by the 
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globalisation of capitalism and power, and by the decline of unchecked state 
power…” (DM, 2015). His argument is that the media, as the state, is equally 
accountable to the public that it purports to represent and serve.    
 
In the same breath the digital revolution taking place in South Africa has upset 
the status quo with traditional media and it no longer is business as it used to be, 
dwindling readership and circulation figures are evidence of this. The general 
public, the ordinary voter, has an opportunity to have their voices heard on social 
media, in reader comments of the different online newspaper platforms as well as 
on different blogging sites. The discourse taking place in the opinion and 
analyses sections of the Mail & Guardian and The Daily Maverick gives some of 
kind of hope that traditional media are not the sole information providers and 
public platforms for debate, but in-depth analysis, debate and education on South 
Africa‟s democracy is taking place on other media platforms accessible to all 
socio-economic classes. What Mtimde poses as a concern when he asks 
“…what and who decides what we will see, read and experience; and what we 
won‟t? Who decides what is important and what is unimportant?” (Mtimde, 2015) 
might soon not be cause for concern, as public engagement is taking place on 
different media platforms, and hopefully legislation currently muted will not have 
to be so stringent as to choke dialogue on South Africa‟s democracy. 
 
To conclude, Former President Thabo Mbeki‟s observation and concern on 
framing and representation is that “…in time, these stories begin to define who 
and what we are…in due course, as we come to believe the resultant image of 
ourselves, we also begin to act the part…” (Thabo Mbeki, 2008). 
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APPENDIX A 
Article 1 – “Dusty divisions, empty promises” (M&G, April 4 – April 10 2014) 
Article 2 – “DA to challenge ANC in court on food parcels” (ST, April 20 2014) 
Article 3 – “Juju not walking the talk with his expensive shoes” (ST, April 20 2014) 
Article 4 – “ANC in jobs-for-votes probe” (M&G, January 24 – January 30 2014) 
Article 5 – “Where blood flows thicker than water” (ST, January 19 2014) 
Article 6 – “Blackouts spell life or death for some” (ST, March 09 2014 
Article 7 – “ANC swigs Nkandla Kool Aid” (M&G, January 10 – January 16 2014) 
Article 8 – “Gauteng ads show ANC’s true colours” (M&G, January 17 – January 23 2014) 
Article 9 – “Internal power play trumps voter choice” (ST,   
Article 10 – “No easy wait for their cabinet nod” (ST,  
Article 11 – “Ministerial merry-go-round” (M&G, May 30 – June 05 2014) 
Article 12 – “I feared for my life” (ST, March 23 2014) 
Article 13 – “Madonsela puts Gogo Dlamini first” (M&G, March 20 – March 27 2014) 
Article 14 – “Phiyega leads police in splurge” (ST, February 09 2014) 
Article 15 – “Never mind Thuli, long may Hlaudi reign, says SABC chief” (M&G, February  
         21 – February 27 2014) 
Article 16 – “State hands out R10bn ARV tenders” (CP, December 24 2014) 
Article 17 – “From critical condition to stable” (M&G, April 11 – April 17 2014) 
Article 18 – “Gigaba’s spin hits the skids on patronage” (M&G April 17 – April 24 2014) 
Sample of Mail & Guardian lead pages 
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